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SOMETHING OLD, SOMETHING NEW: APPLYING THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO SNOWMAKING 
Alethea O'DonneU* 
"By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air, 
running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea."! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Skiing in America is big business.2 Many ski resorts are finding that 
because of tough competition from neighboring operations, they must 
expand their resorts with more trails, more lifts, and consequently, 
more snow.3 This increased competition, coupled with a decreased 
natural snowfall, has made ski resorts extremely dependent on snow-
making for their surviva1.4 Ski resorts have become so dependent on 
snowmaking, in fact, that without snowmaking, a ski resort in today's 
market probably would go out of business.5 
Environmental groups allege that harmful environmental conse-
quences accompany the making of snow.6 In order to create a sufficient 
amount of snow to cover the ski slopes, a resort must draw water from 
some water source, such as a stream, pond, or lake.7 Environmental-
* Managing Editor, 1996-1997, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 J. INST. 2.1.1. 
2 See Frank P. Urso, Vermont's Snow War, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1996, at 13. 
3 See John Laidler, Snow Making Comes Under a Cloud, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1993, at A5. 
4Id. 
5 See Tony Chamberlain, Groom and Doom at Sugarbush, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1993, at 56. 
6 Laidler, supra note 3, at A5; see also Lewis Milford, A Warning in Vermont's Snow War, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1996, at 15. 
7 See Jerry Beilinson, Ski Area Impacts: The Bogs Behind the Brawls, SKIING TIMES NEWS, 
Feb. 1994, at 26. 
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ists allege that these water withdrawals adversely affect the habitats 
of fish and other aquatic life in the water, habitats that traditionally 
are protected by the public trust doctrine.8 Environmentalists are 
attempting to halt these effects upon aquatic habitats by filing law-
suits to limit the amount of water that a resort can withdraw for 
snowmaking.9 
Environmentalists have used a number of legal theories to chal-
lenge snowmaking. For example, the Loon Mountain resort case deals 
with the New Hampshire ski area's increased use of nearby Loon 
Pond for snowmaking.lO The Loon Mountain case involves allegations 
of Clean Water Act (CWA)l1 and National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)12 violations.13 Environmentalists also filed two complaints in 
Vermont, dealing with the Okemo Mountain resort and the Sugarbush 
Ski Resort, under state statutes.14 The plaintiffs in Okemo, the Con-
servation Law Foundation and the Connecticut River Watershed 
Council, alleged that the resort had violated various Vermont statutes 
pertaining to streams, shorelines, wildlife habitats, and developments 
affecting public investments.15 In the Sugarbush case, the Vermont 
Natural Resources Council and the Sierra Club appealed the granting 
of a permit for water withdrawal for snowmaking from the Mad River 
to the Sugarbush resort by the Vermont Agency of Natural Re-
sources.16 
These New England cases reached different results. Okemo gener-
ally is regarded as a success for environmentalists because the Ver-
mont Environmental Board weighed the impact of the withdrawals 
on the fish population against the impact of less water on the ski 
resort.17 The board ultimately struck a balance between the two in-
8 See id.; see also W.H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16, at 171-73 (lst ed. 1977). 
9 See Laidler, supra note 3, at A5. 
10 Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 95-50-B, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16608, at *1 
(D.N.H. Nov. 2,1995), appeal docketed, No. 96-1068 (1st Cir. Jan. 24,1996) [hereinafer Dubois]. 
For ease of identification, in the text this case will be referred to as the Loon Mountain case. 
11 33 U .S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (1995). 
1242 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1995). 
13 Dubois, supra note 10, at *1. 
14 See Okemo Mountain, Inc., Application No. 2S0351-12A-EB, 1992 WL 186658, at *1 (Vt. 
Envtl. Bd. July 23, 1992) [hereinafter Okemo]; In re Appeal of Vermont Natural Resources 
Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92-05 at *1 (Vt. Water Resources Bd. Feb. 8, 1993) (findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order), motion to alter or reconsider denied March 1, 1993; see also Re 
Pico Peak Ski Resort, Inc., No. lR0265-12-EB, 1995 WL 115899, at *1 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. Nov. 22, 
1995) (snowmaking case currently being adjudicated). 
15 Okemo, 1992 WL 186658, at *2. 
16 See Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92-05, at 1. 
17 See Joseph S. McLean, Note, Streamflow Policy in Vermont: Managing Conflicting De-
mands on the State's Waters, 19 VT. L. REV. 191,244 (1994). 
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terests.18 Environmentalists consider the result in the Sugarbush case 
to be less successful, however, because the Vermont Water Resources 
Board allowed the resort to withdraw water in quantities far exceed-
ing those which environmentalists felt were necessary to preserve 
aquatic habitats.19 Finally, the result in the Loon Mountain case, 
where the judge disregarded all of the plaintiff's environmental 
claims, likewise proved disappointing for environmental groupS.20 
Courts and administrative agencies have used differing approaches 
to resolve the conflicts between environmentalists, who seek protec-
tion for natural habitats, and ski resort owners and developers, who 
desire to maintain large and economically prosperous ski resorts.21 
One theory that New England courts have not yet reviewed or en-
dorsed, but that provides a more flexible approach, is the public trust 
doctrine.22 The public trust doctrine is premised on the public's right 
to protection of its natural resources.23 The doctrine is versatile in 
application because it theorizes simply that any natural resource that 
is held for the "free use of the general public" deserves to be allocated 
fairly and with an eye towards ultimate perpetuation of the resource.24 
Because of its flexible nature, the public trust doctrine is a possible 
solution for environmentalists who seek to halt the continuing devel-
opment of lands for ski resorts.25 
The most successful snowmaking suit to date, Aspen Wilderness 
Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board, was premised 
on the public trust doctrine.26 In Aspen, the Colorado Supreme Court 
found for the plaintiff because the defendant Colorado Water Conser-
vation Board, by allowing water withdrawals of Snowmass Creek for 
snowmaking, had breached its "fiduciary duty" to the people of Colo-
rado as trustees of the creek.27 Although the majority opinion never 
used the term "public trust doctrine," the idea of a state holding its 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See Dubois, supra note 10, at *59. 
21 See McLean, supra note 17, at 244. 
22 See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, at 1, Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Barbara Ripley (Super. Ct. Washington County, Vt., 
Feb. 13, 1995) (No. 74-2-96WCCV) (supporting memorandum to complaint invoking public trust 
doctrine to prevent increased water withdrawals for snowmaking) [hereinafter Plaintiff's 
Memorandum] (copy on file with B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.). 
23 RODGERS, supra note 8, at 171. 
24 [d. at 172. 
25 See id. 
26 See Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 
1256 (Colo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 321 (Sept. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Aspen]. 
27 See id. 
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resources in trust under a fiduciary duty to its citizens implicates this 
doctrine.28 Aspen appears to be a gateway to the use of the public 
trust doctrine in New England.29 
This Comment explores potential applications of the public trust 
doctrine to New England snowmaking cases filed by environmental 
groups trying to prevent further development in areas such as the 
Green Mountain National Forest in Vermont and the White Mountain 
National Forest in New Hampshire. Section II explains the environ-
mental and economic issues involved in snowmaking. Section III ex-
plores the history of snowmaking cases in New England. Section IV 
presents the history of the public trust doctrine and the Aspen case, 
which successfully utilized the public trust doctrine to halt increased 
water withdrawals for snowmaking. Finally, Section V considers the 
application of the public trust doctrine to the New England cases and 
to legislative decisionmaking on the issues of snowmaking and ski 
resort development. 
II. SNOWMAKING'S IMPACT ON AQUATIC LIFE 
A. Modern Snowmaking 
In modern ski resorts, snowmaking machines dot the landscape.3o 
The large, rounded machines divert water from a river or lake, 
through underground pipes buried beneath the mountain.31 After the 
diverted water is mixed with compressed air, the mixture splits into 
small particles that freeze into crystals.32 The snowmaking machines, 
through a gun attached to a hydrant, then blow these crystals onto 
the slopes and this covers the mountain with man-made "snow."33 
Most thriving resorts now utilize snowmaking to a great extent.34 
Since 1985, there has been less and less natural snow falling on N orth-
eastern ski slopes.35 Although 1995-96 and 1993-94 stand as record-
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 56. 
31 Laidler, supra note 3, at A5. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. According to ski resort owners and developers, man-made snow is also more durable 
than natural snow. As Joe Parkinson, executive director of the Vermont Ski Areas Association, 
said, "[e]ven if we had the snow years we did in the '70s ... the way people ski today, it wouldn't 
be enough. You'd still need the manmade snow. It just lasts and lasts." Chamberlain, supra note 
5, at 56. 
34 See Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 56. 
35 See id. 
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breaking New England snowfall years, the overall weather pattern 
in the last decade has been uneven, with some years experiencing 
very little natural snowfall.36 Because of the decrease in natural snow, 
resorts increasingly rely upon snowmaking, as illustrated by the fact 
that more than seventy percent of the snow on Vermont's ski slopes 
is manmade.37 The Sugarbush Resort in Warren, Vermont, whose 
snowmaking battle is one of the cases studied in this Comment, uses 
approximately 380 million gallons of water each year in order to make 
sufficient snow to cover its slopes.38 Other large resorts in Vermont, 
including Stratton, Mt. Snow, Okemo, and Killington, have close to 
ninety percent coverage with manmade snow.39 
Ski resort owners and developers enunciate persuasive economic 
arguments in favor of continuing vast water withdrawals in order to 
keep ski resorts alive.40 Ski resorts generally are very lucrative for a 
state. For example, in 1992, skiing in Vermont generated approxi-
mately 280 million dollars of in-state spending.41 Analysts estimate 
that the skiing industry is Vermont's second largest.42 The overall 
travel industry in Vermont in 1990 generated fifty-five million dollars 
in tax revenues.43 
In order to maintain these profits, ski resort developers argue that 
expansion and the accompanying increased snowmaking machinery 
are necessary.44 Developers generally believe if a ski area does not 
36 David Arnold, Record Snows Bring a Shrug, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1996, at 13; see also 
Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 56. 
37 Laidler, supra note 3, at A5; see also Kenneth Wapner, Turning Rivers into Snow: Envi-
ronmental Impact of Snow Machines, BACKPACKER, Feb. 1994, at 10. 
3S Laurie Peach, Ski Areas Have a Big Thirst, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 2,1992, 
at 10. 
39 Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 56. 
40 Laidler, supra note 3, at A5. 
41 ld.; see also Art Edelstein, Travel Industry Still Big Business, VT. Bus. MAG., Jan. 1992, 
at 34 (estimating that Mount Snow brings approximately $47 million annually to town of Stowe, 
Vermont). 
42 Edelstein, supra note 41, at 34. 
43 ld. 
44 See id. On the issue of resorts' authority to expand, it is important to note that many New 
England ski resorts are located on National Forest Service lands. See C. Wayne McKinzie, Note, 
Ski Area Development After the National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986: Still an Uphill 
Battle, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 299 n.6 (1993). The National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986 
governs developers who desire to build or expand resorts on these lands. 16 U.S.C. § 497b (1985 
and Supp. 1996). This act gives the United States Secretary of Agriculture the power to grant 
a permit to developers for use of "suitable" lands within the National Forest System. ld. 
§ 497b(b). Additionally, in language that nods at public trust principles, the Secretary may cancel 
the permit if the Secretary determines that the area is "needed for higher public purposes." ld. 
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have snowmaking equipment, it eventually will be forced to go out of 
business.45 Resort owners argue that without increased snowmaking 
capabilities they will be forced into bankruptcy due to competition 
from other neighboring mountain developments that profit from bet-
ter access to water and thus easier snowmaking.46 Developers believe 
that snowmaking machines are essential to the survival of the skiing 
industry in New England.47 
B. Snowmaking's Effects 
In recent years expanded snowmaking and accompanying resort 
development have increasingly come under criticism from environ-
mentalists.48 Criticism generally focuses on the effect of the with-
drawal of water from surrounding lakes and streams upon fish and 
other aquatic life in those bodies ofwater.49 An initial issue is the sheer 
amount of water needed: generally, snowmaking systems divert 
150,000 gallons of water to cover just one acre with a foot of snow.5O 
Resort owners argue that this figure is unimportant, because during 
the spring thaw the melted snow all returns to the streams or lakes 
from which the resorts originally took the water.51 Environmental 
groups, however, argue that the time during which resorts remove 
the most water from streams, the winter, is actually the most critical 
time for fish.52 November, for example, is when brown trout spawn.53 
November is also a month when resorts often make large amounts of 
snow.54 These increased water withdrawals may cause low waterflow 
§ 497b(b)(5). The Act also reaffirms that the Secretary has a duty to act according to the 
guidelines of the National Environmental Policy Act, or the Forest and Rangelands Renewable 
Resources Planning Act, including the duty to "involve the public in his decisionmaking and 
planning for the national forests." [d. § 497b(d). 
45 Edelstein, supra note 41, at 34; see also Tom Knudson, Ski Resort Makes Snow-And Wins 
Friends, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 15, 1993, at A16 (quoting Stan Hansen, vice president of a 
western ski resort, as saying: "Snowmaking is our life. We can't sustain our operation without 
snowmaking."). 
46 Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 56. 
47 Urso, supra note 2, at 13. 
48 See Laidler, supra note 3, at A5. 
49 Beilinson, supra note 7, at 26; see also McLean, supra note 17, at 196-203 (fully describing 
specific effects of increased water withdrawals upon aquatic life); Plaintiff's Memorandum, 
supra note 22, at 2-7 (describing effects of reduced streamflows on fisheries in Vermont). 
50 Laidler, supra note 3, at A5. 
51 See Peach, supra note 38, at 10. 
52 See id. 
53 Wapner, supra note 37, at 10. 
54 [d. 
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over streambeds, making it difficult for trout to reproduce.55 During 
January and February stream flows are at their lowest, and removing 
water from already low streams can cause ice buildups.56 In turn, 
these ice buildups can freeze trout and their incubating eggs, as well 
as other aquatic life.57 Additionally, the speed of a stream's flow gen-
erally decreases as a result of water withdrawals.58 This decreased 
speed may create additional problems in the winter when eggs are 
incubating and need a specific amount of oxygen to survive, because 
low levels of slowly-moving water may not carry sufficient quantities 
of oxygen.59 Snowmaking effects are not limited to fish: insects are 
harmed as wel1.60 In April, insect eggs in the water need steady 
streamflows in order to hatch; this spring hatch then creates an insect 
population upon which other lifeforms feed.61 The lack of steady 
streams harms the hatching processes of these insects.62 Environmen-
talists argue that these effects upon streams eventually will reach 
birds and mammals, such as beaver and elk, who live in the surround-
ing area and feed from the streams.63 Environmentalists fear that 
ultimately the entire ecosystem will feel the effect of the water with-
drawals.64 
Conflicts therefore arise between ski resort owners and environ-
mental groupS.65 As discussed previously, resort developers generally 
believe that they must withdraw water to cover their slopes to con-
tinue to operate profitably, bringing needed revenue to New England 
states.66 On the other hand, environmental groups oppose increased 
water withdrawals, fearing species depletion from streams and 
lakes.67 The snowmaking litigation in the United States arises from 
this clash of perspectives. 
55 [d. 
56 Peach, supra note 38, at 10. 
57 [d. 
58 Beilinson, supra note 7, at 26. 
59 [d. 
60 Wapner, supra note 37, at 10. 
6! [d. 
62 See id. 
63 Hugh Dellios, Artificial Snowrnaking Puts Ski Resorts on a Slippery Slope; Colorado Court 
to Rule on Claims of Damage to Wildlife, CHI. ThIB., Jan. 8, 1995, at 6. 
64 See Wapner, supra note 37, at 26. 
65 See Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 56. 
66 [d. 
67 See Thomas A. Lepisto, The Downhill Debate: Whether to Build or Expand Alpine Ski 
Facilities, WILDERNESS, Mar. 22, 1994, at 23 ("Much of the movement for reform is coming not 
only from national conservation organizations like The Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club 
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III. THE NEW ENGLAND SNOWMAKING CASES 
Environmental groups have filed cases attempting to address the 
environmental and economic issues associated with snowmaking in 
both New England and Colorado, before both adjudicative agencies 
and courts of law, and under different legal theories.68 No New Eng-
land courts have recognized the public trust doctrine in the snowmak-
ing area.69 In order to analyze the potential effectiveness of applying 
the public trust doctrine to the snowmaking issue in New England, it 
is necessary to review briefly the facts of each of the New England 
cases, and the theories involved. 
A. The Loon Mountain Case 
The most recently decided of the New England snowmaking cases 
is Dubois v. United States Department of Agriculture, which involves 
the Loon Mountain ski resort.70 This case, in which the District Court 
judge granted summary judgment for the defendants on November 
2, 1995, represents the environmentalists' least successful outcome.71 
However, the plaintiff, Roland Dubois, has appealed the decision to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and thus the 
outcome of the decision is not yet final. 72 
The Loon Mountain case involves the Loon Mountain ski area in 
Lincoln, New Hampshire, in the White Mountain National Forest.73 
In 1986, Loon Mountain resort asked the Forest Service for an 
amendment to its special use permit to allow the resort to expand.74 
The resort asked to expand with an additional 930 acres of the forest 
land, to add a number of lifts, trails, and a lodge, and to construct an 
expanded snowmaking system that would utilize water drawn pri-
marily from nearby Loon Pond.75 The Forest Service in 1988 decided 
that because of the large scope of the project, NEPA required an 
but from local groups-often the members of mountain communities-and from many skiers 
who feel that decades of resort development have driven the qualities of naturalness and 
wildness from too many mountain environments."). 
68 See infra notes 70-178 and accompanying text. 
69 See id. 
70 Dubois, supra note 10, at *1. 
71 [d. at *60. 
72 [d. Oral argument was heard on the case on September 10, 1996. 
73 [d. at *1. 
74 [d. 
75 Dubois, supra note 10, at *3--4. 
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Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).76 After issuing a Draft EIS 
(DEIS) in February, 1989, the Forest Service issued a supplement to 
the DEIS in November, 1989 because of concerns regarding observa-
tions of unusually low water levels in the East Branch of the Pemige-
was set River which discharges into the pond.77 In January, 1991, the 
Forest Service issued a Revised DEIS (RDEIS), in which it listed an 
additional five options for the ski resort expansion.78 Finally, in N 0-
vember, 1992, the Forest Service issued a Final EIS (FE IS) that 
proposed a sixth option allowing Loon to improve its existing facili-
ties, expand onto 581 acres of Forest Service land, widen existing 
trails, add new trails and one new lift, improve existing lifts and 
restaurants, and allow significant expansion of the resort's snowmak-
ing system through the installation of new pipes and the extension of 
snowmaking to all trails in both the old and new permit areas.79 The 
proposal designated Loon Pond as the primary water source for this 
expansion, and allowed the resort to draw down the pond's water level 
by as much as fifteen feet for snowmaking.80 The town of Lincoln, 
which uses the pond as a source for drinking water, could also draw 
down the pond's water level by an additional five feet.81 The Forest 
Service issued a Record of Decision (ROD) approving the proposal on 
March 1, 1993.82 
After exhausting all of his administrative remedies, plaintiff Dubois 
filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture.83 
76Id. at *3. 
77Id. at *4. 
78Id. at *4 (alternatives given were: no action; Loon's initial proposal; scaled-down develop-
ment which implemented first phase of Loon's initial proposal; limited development with permit 
area of only 320 acres; and limited development within Loon's existing permit area). Id. at *5. 
79Id. at *5--6. 
80 Dubois, supra note 10, at *6. As a mitigation measure, Loon resort is required to refill the 
pond by May first of each year with water pumped from the East Branch of the Pemigewasset 
River.Id. 
8! Id. at *6. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *1, *6-7. Plaintiff Dubois sued as an individual citizen. Id. at *1. RESTORE: The 
North Woods, an environmental group, also joined the suit as an intervenor. Id. The court denied 
the defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing, holding that because some of RE-
STORE's members lived and worked in the area near the ski resort, and would allegedly be 
harmed by the expansion, the group had standing to pursue the claim. Id. at *2 n.1. The court 
did not, therefore, reach the issue of whether or not a suit by Dubois alone would have standing, 
because it held that the case could progress as long as one of the plaintiffs had standing. Id. 
Individual citizens may raise this type of lawsuit against a government agency, however, by 
seeking review under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U .S.C. § 702 (1977 & Supp. 
1996); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972) (in order to maintain a lawsuit, 
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In attempting to halt the proposed increased water withdrawals, the 
plaintiff charged that the ROD violated the CWA because it allowed 
Loon Mountain to discharge water from the East Branch into Loon 
Pond without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
permit.B4 The plaintiff also alleged that the use of Loon Pond violated 
state water quality standards enacted pursuant to the CWA, and that 
the Forest Service violated NEPA in its inadequate preparation of 
the EIS.85 
In granting the Forest Service's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire 
rejected all of Dubois's claims. On the issue of the CWA claim, the 
District Court said that because the East Branch of the Pemigewasset 
River and Loon Pond were the same body of navigable water, it was 
theoretically impossible for one body of water to add pollutants to 
itself.86 The court also rejected the plaintiff's state water quality 
standards claim.87 The plaintiff argued that the certification that the 
Forest Service had obtained from the State of New Hampshire, which 
stated that the proposed activity did not violate state water quality 
standards, was granted improperly.88 The court rejected this argu-
ment on the ground that it was a state claim outside federal court 
jurisdiction.89 
parties must have "a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial 
resolution of that controversy"). However, in order for a plaintiff to establish a right to relief, 
the plaintiff must show that he or she has been affected by some "agency action" and that the 
plaintiff has been "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702. The injury complained of must therefore be an injury in fact, 
and fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the relevant statute. Lujan v. National 
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); see also Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 848 (D. 
Colo. 1985) (plaintiff's claim that government officials' failure to assert reserved water rights 
for wilderness areas harmed the "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" values of the 
wilderness area the agencies were intended to protect was a sufficient "injury in fact" to 
maintain standing). 
84 Dubois, supra note 10, at *2. 
85 ld. at *2. 
86 See id. at *23. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that water drawn into a 
snowmaking system loses its status as "navigable waters," reasoning that commercially ex-
ploited water does not mean that the same water cannot be navigable, and that because the 
resort added no pollutants to the water, there was no need for a discharge permit. ld. at *20-21. 
87 ld. at *25-26. 
88 I d. at *24. 
89 Dubois, supra note 10, at *25. The Court refused to review this argument because the CWA 
expressly delegates to each individual state the duty to determine whether an activity will 
violate state water quality standards. ld. The court stated that because the First Circuit has 
determined that federal courts do not have the authority to review requirements under state 
law certification programs, the plaintiff should have exhausted his state administrative remedies 
and then filed suit in a state court. ld. at *25-26. 
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Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's NEPA claim, the heart of 
the plaintiff's snowmaking case, which argued that the Forest Serv-
ice's FEIS had not identified adequately and discussed alternatives, 
described the affected environment, or considered generally the ac-
tion's environmental impact.90 In reviewing this claim, the court dis-
cussed each of the Forest Service's duties in preparing its EIS, in-
cluding presenting and evaluating alternatives, identifying preferred 
alternatives, and including appropriate mitigation measures.9! On the 
issue of possible alternatives to snowmaking, the court said that the 
Forest Service had reviewed adequately and rejected the proposed 
alternatives, which consisted of either constructing an artificial pond 
to mitigate Loon Pond demand, or using water storage tanks.92 The 
court held that the Forest Service's rejection of the alternatives was 
appropriate because storage tanks were too large, and their construc-
tion would have adverse environmental impacts, and because con-
struction of an artificial pond was not feasible due to "size and prob-
lems with water collection and use."93 
The court also rejected Dubois's claim that the Forest Service had 
not gathered sufficient data regarding the environmental impacts of 
increased withdrawals from Loon Pond.94 The plaintiff alleged that 
the Forest Service should have evaluated the plants and animals in 
the pond, tested the waters for a prolonged period, inventoried plant 
species, determined the effect of the drawdowns of the pond, docu-
mented the pond's limnological cycles, and determined what birds and 
animals were using the pond.95 The court decided that the Forest 
Service had done sufficient investigation into the state of the pond 
through its survey of aquatic plants, invertebrates, and tadpoles.96 
The court upheld the Forest Service's decision that the low pH of the 
pond would never sustain a fish population.97 The court also rejected 
a "worst-case scenario" letter from a Forest Service scientist stating 
that the proposed drawdown and refill of the pond would destroy all 
plants and animals in the littoral zone of the pond, increase the pond's 
turbidity and acidity, and destroy any of Loon Pond's fisheries poten-
tial.98 
90 Id. at *26--27, *60. 
91Id. at *27-60. 
92 Id. at *33-34. 
93 I d. at *35--36. 
94 Dubois, supra note 10, at *41. 
95 I d. at *36. 
96 Id. at *41. 
97 Id. at *38. 
98Id. at *39 n.ll. 
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The court admitted that further studies of Loon Pond might have 
been beneficial, but nonetheless decided that the Forest Service stud-
ies performed were adequate.99 The court ultimately disregarded all 
of the plaintiff's arguments in favor of weighing the benefits and 
burdens of increased snowmaking on the state's environment and its 
economy.100 Instead, the court simply agreed with the Forest Service 
that "snowmaking has become a necessity in eastern skiing," and 
found that the court need only review alternatives to increased snow-
making, rather than questioning the propriety of snowmaking alto-
gether.101 
The outcome of the Loon resort case reflects the fact that certain 
courts give great deference to administrative decisions, and are un-
willing to consider the benefits of extended research of the effects of 
water withdrawals.102 Because of this refusal, the case is disappointing 
for environmental groups. 
B. The Sugarbush Resort Case 
Unlike the Loon Mountain case, the Sugarbush case was adjudi-
cated before a state agency: Vermont's Water Resources Board 
(WRB).103 Like the Loon Mountain decision, however, the environ-
mental groups who were the plaintiffs in the Sugarbush appeal 
achieved less than they had hoped, and ski resorts generally consider 
the decision by the WRB a victory.104 
The Sugarbush case involved an appeal by various environmental 
groups, including the Vermont Natural Resources Council, Trout Un-
limited, and the Sierra Club (collectively, VNRC), to a permit granted 
to the developers of the Sugarbush Resort to construct an impound-
ment.105 This impoundment consisted of a facility for water with-
drawal from the Mad River, and an off-stream pond for containment 
of that water so that the resort could expand its operations and 
99 Dubois, supra note 10, at *41. The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments regarding 
public comments concerning the effect of low dissolved oxygen levels in the pond, inadequate 
evaluation of the town's drinking needs, the cumulative effects of the expansion, and increased 
local traffic. Id. at *42-50. 
100 Id. at *53. 
101Id. at *53-55 (emphasis in original). 
102 See id. at *55. 
103 See In re Appeal of Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-D2 and 92-D5, at 1 (Vt. 
Water Resources Bd. Feb. 8, 1993) (findings of fact, conclusions of law and order), rrwtions to 
alter or reconsider denied Mar. 1, 1993. 
104 See McLean, supra note 17, at 244. 
105 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-D2 and 92-D5, at 1. 
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snowmaking capabilities.lo6 The plaintiffs appealed on two grounds, 
the first as to the propriety of the WRB's granting a permit allowing 
the dam.107 The plaintiffs' other appeal was regarding the propriety of 
the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, Department of Environ-
mental Conservation (ANR), granting a Water Quality Certification 
to the Sugarbush developers after the agency found that the snow-
making pond would not violate Vermont water quality standards.108 
The WRB granted the plaintiffs party status under both appeals. 109 
The WRB reviewed the background of the project and the proposed 
increase in withdrawals of water from the Mad River.110 Sugarbush 
proposed to build a 9.6 acre pond, attached by pipes to the river, which 
would withdraw water only when the river was flowing at a level of 
.50 cubic feet per second per square mile (csm) or more.11l The snow-
making system would include safety mechanisms that would not allow 
withdrawals when the rate of the river was .50 csm or less, and 
Sugarbush planned to maintain a daily record of flow measure-
ments.112 Sugarbush also included as part of its proposal a "habitat 
restoration and enhancement management plan" in order to mitigate 
effects from the withdrawal.113 
In deciding to allow the project to proceed, the WRB recognized 
that under Vermont environmental law the development would have 
to serve the "public good," for the "greatest benefit of the people of 
the state."114 To apply this standard, the Board looked at thirteen 
elements under Title 10, Section 1086 of the Vermont Statutes regard-
ing the environmental effects of the proposed developmentsY5 The 
106 [d. 
107 [d. 
108 [d. 
109 [d. at 2. 
110 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92-05, at 3-9. 
111 [d. at 4-5. 
112 [d. at 5--6. 
113 [d. at 23-24. 
114 [d. at 7 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1086 (1984)). 
115 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92-05, at 7 n.4 ("[T]he thirteen 
elements to be considered are: (1) quantity, kind and extent of cultivated agricultural land that 
may be rendered unfit for use by the project, including both the immediate and long range 
agricultural land use impacts; (2) scenic and recreational values; (3) fish and wildlife; (4) forests 
and forest programs; (5) the need for a minimum water discharge flow rate schedule to protect 
the natural rate of flow and water quality of the affected waters; (6) the existing uses of the 
water by the public for boating, fishing, swimming and other recreational uses; (7) the creation 
of any hazard to navigation, fishing, swimming or other public uses; (8) the need for cutting 
clean and removal of all timber or tree growth from all or part of the flowage area; (9) the 
creation of any public benefits; (10) the classification, if any, of the affected waters under ch. 47 
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WRB then reviewed each element in turn to decide whether the pond 
and the increased withdrawals would benefit the public good.u6 
The WRB gave special consideration to particular enumerated ele-
ments. The WRB went into great depth on the third element, which 
required that the WRB consider the development's effect on "fish and 
wildlife."117 The WRB recognized the presence of an excellent trout 
habitat in the Mad River, including brook, brown, and rainbow, as well 
as other non-game fish species.u8 The WRB found, however, that the 
best fish habitat was upstream of the proposed development, and that 
the fish population near the water withdrawal project was actually 
substantially smaller than the population in other Vermont rivers.ll9 
The WRB also reviewed the study that the Sugarbush developers 
had prepared on the effects of water withdrawals on the Mad River.12o 
Despite the fact that the study seemed unreliable because of unpre-
dicted ice buildup, the WRB nonetheless supported the ANR's review 
of the study and subsequent decision to grant permits to Sugarbush.121 
Additionally, the WRB said that despite the fact that the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service had prepared a flow policy for New 
England streams, Vermont was not bound by this policy.122 The WRB 
noted that .50 csm flows might occur naturally in some parts of the 
river and agreed with the resort's study, which said that a reduced 
flow of .50 csm "would have no significant effect on egg mortality 
beyond that which occurs naturally in the Mad River."123 Therefore, 
the WRB held that the resort's proposal was acceptable and met the 
Fish and Wildlife Service's alternative as biologically justified.124 
The WRB also carefully analyzed the element requiring "the crea-
tion of any public benefits," and in this element the WRB's policy 
decision regarding the economic benefits of ski resorts to the state is 
clear.125 The WRB found that Sugarbush's share of the Vermont area 
of Title 10; (11) any applicable state, regional or municipal plans; (12) municipal grand lists and 
revenues; and (13) public safety."). 
116 [d. at 7, 8. 
117 [d. at 11-22. 
118 [d. at II. 
119 [d. at 11, 12. One might ask whether the existing difference in population which the WRB 
found in its review was actually due to previous levels of withdrawal, which had possibly already 
affected the nearby trout population. [d. at 12. 
120 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92-05, at 13-14. 
121 [d. at 13-14. 
122 [d. at 15. 
123 [d. at 20. 
124 [d. at 2I. 
125 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92-05, at 25-26. 
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ski industry had declined over twenty-nine percent from 1986 to 
1991.I26 The WRB compared Sugarbush's revenues to those of other 
resorts, finding that while Sugarbush had been losing "skier days" in 
the same time period, other resorts that made more than eighty 
percent of their own snow had been attracting more skiers on more 
days throughout the season.127 The WRB found that Sugarbush's eco-
nomic decline was creating an impact that was "substantial[ly] and 
adversely affect[ing] the economy of several towns in the Mad River 
valley."128 Further, the WRB found that if Sugarbush were allowed to 
expand, the expansion would allow the resort to recapture its histori-
cal share of the skiing market, would allow the state to receive addi-
tional taxes from sales, rooms, and meals, would stabilize property 
values in the area, and would create not only temporary construction 
jobs, but might also create jobs that would increase the Sugarbush 
labor force with an additional five to twelve permanent employees and 
forty to seventy seasonal employees.129 The WRB evidently believed 
that these economic factors created a "public benefit" justifying the 
expansion.130 
Later in the decision, the WRB reiterated its conclusion with policy 
language based on economics.13l The WRB decided that the adverse 
environmental effects that would result from the increased withdraw-
als were less important than the adverse economic and social impacts 
on the people of the state that would result if the WRB enforced 
higher streamflow standards.132 Further, the WRB found that because 
Vermont had adopted no specific policy as to minimum streamflow, 
Sugarbush had met its burden by demonstrating the public benefits 
that would derive from expanded snowmaking and development.133 
Finally, although the plaintiffs argued that the public trust doctrine 
protected the Mad River, the WRB refused to adjudicate the doctrine 
on its merits. l34 The VNRC argued that the public trust doctrine was 
applicable because it prohibits the use of public waters for private 
purposes.135 In rejecting this argument, the WRB found that the 
state's judiciary or legislature should define the breadth of the public 
126 I d. at 25. 
127Id. 
128Id. 
129Id. at 25. 
130 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92---02 and 92---05, at 25-26. 
131Id. at 36. 
132Id. 
133 See id. at 37, 3S. 
134 Id. at 40. 
135 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92---02 and 92---05, at 39. 
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trust doctrine.136 However, despite this lack of definition, the WRB 
decided that it should not delay review of the proposal pending public 
trust or constitutional challenges because to do so would thwart the 
Vermont legislature's intention of encouraging permits for water 
use.137 Finally, the WRB decided that water quality management "pre-
sumes a balancing between the goals of, on the one hand protecting 
and enhancing water quality, and on the other allowing environmen-
tally sound development,"I38 and that the ANR had analyzed and 
balanced these goals properly.139 
Ultimately, the WRB's final order allowed Sugarbush to proceed 
with the development and affirmed the previous granting of the per-
mits.140 The WRB made only minor modifications in stream flow, al-
lowing for a "step-down" policy over time of flows between the rates 
of.79 csm and .50 csm.141 Although the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter 
or Reconsider the Decision, the WRB denied this motion on March 1, 
1993.142 
This decision, which allows for water withdrawals at a much lower 
rate than the environmentalist plaintiffs had hoped for, is similar to 
the Loon resort case in its pro-development outcome.143 The case 
involving the Okemo Mountain resort, however, demonstrates a bet-
ter balancing of interests between economic and environmental con-
cerns.l44 
C. The Okemo Mountain Case 
The Environmental Board of the State of Vermont decided the case 
of Okemo Mountain in July, 1992.145 This case involved an appeal to a 
state agency by the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) and the 
136 I d. at 40. 
137 ld. at 41. 
138 ld. 
139 See id. at 41. 
140 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92"'{)2 and 92--05, at 41. 
141 ld. at 42. The WRB held that for the first year the resort could not reduce the Mad River's 
minimum flow rate below .79 csm; for the next five subsequent years the minimum flow could 
not go below .61 csm; and after the sixth year the rate could not go below .61 csm unless the 
storage pond was storing less than fifty percent of its capacity, in which case the rate of the 
river could be reduced to .50 csm. ld. 
142 In re Appeal of Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92"'{)2 and 92--05, at 1 (Vt. Water 
Resources Bd. Mar. 1, 1993) (memorandum of decision, motions to alter or reconsider). 
143 See McLean, supra note 17, at 244. 
144 See id. 
145 Okemo Mountain, Inc., Application No. 2S0351-12A-EB, 1992 WL 186658, at *1 (Vt. Envtl. 
Bd. July 23, 1992). 
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Connecticut River Watershed Council (CRWC).146 In Okemo, the 
Board initially granted the ski resort a Land Use Permit in 1988 to 
withdraw water from the Black River for snowmaking, provided that 
the resort maintain a minimum flow of 1.0 csm in the river.147 The 
resort asked, at that time, for increased withdrawals to reduce the 
streamflow to .50 csm.l4B The resort's request was denied, however, 
because, unlike the Sugarbush case, the Commission believed that the 
Okemo resort did not provide evidence that such a low flow would 
protect fish in the Black River.149 Having commissioned its own study 
of the streamflow, the Okemo resort then appealed to the Commission 
for an amendment allowing '''Step-Down' Water Withdrawal Mitiga-
tion Measures," which would allow for varying withdrawals between 
. 75 csm and .50 csm.l60 The District #2 Environmental Commission 
initially denied the resort's request in January, 1990.151 The ski area 
then appealed the denial to the state Environmental Board (the 
Board), adding to its step-down proposal various other remedies for 
environmental protection, including planting vegetation, placing in-
stream structures into the river for fish protection, and stabilizing 
stream banks.l52 After the Okemo resort filed its appeal, the Board 
granted CLF and CRWC party status on several resource protection 
issues.l53 
In its July, 1992 decision, the Board ultimately granted portions of 
the ski area's Motion to Alter.l54 The Board's opinion carefully consid-
ered the various factors at issue in the controversy.l55 The opinion 
noted that in 1991 the resort employed nearly 700 people, generated 
approximately $700,000 in tax revenues for the state, and paid the 
state an annual lease payment of $238,000.156 The Board also noted, 
however, the vast amounts of water that the resort relied on in order 
to make snow and stay competitive: in 1991 the ski area used 280 
million gallons of water for snowmaking, 180 million gallons of which 
were pumped directly from the Black River.157 Moreover, the resort 
146 [d. at *1. 
147 [d. at *2. 
148 [d. at *1. 
149 [d. at *2. 
160 Okerrw, 1992 WL 186658, at *2. 
151 [d. at *1. 
152 [d. at *2. 
163 [d. at *1. 
154 See id. at *1. 
155 See Okerrw, 1992 WL 186658, at *13. 
166 [d. at *3. 
157 [d. 
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hoped to increase its Black River withdrawals to 447 million gallons 
annually.l58 The Board also found that the Black River supports popu-
lations of brown, brook, and rainbow trout, and that brown trout was 
the principal sport fishing species in the river that might be affected 
by the withdrawals.159 
The Board carefully reviewed the ski area's study of the river, 
which stated that the "optimal" flow rate for brown trout spawning 
was 1.1 csm.160 Despite the study's attention to the brown trout, the 
Board criticized the resort's study for not analyzing those insects, 
non-game fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, mammals, and plant life 
that the increased withdrawals also would affect.161 The Board further 
criticized the study for not analyzing the pools in the river-which 
trout need to survive-the actual size of the brown trout population, 
or the effects on the trout of river ice, that results from decreased 
stream flow. l62 
Noting that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service had devel-
oped a minimum winter streamflow for New England of 1.0 csm, the 
Board decided that allowing the ski area to withdraw the river down 
to .50 csm was too extreme.163 The Board decided that a streamflow 
of .50 csm violated the state's stream statutes-statutes that prohibit 
the granting of a permit unless the proponents demonstrate that their 
development will maintain the stream's natural condition.l64 The 
Board reasoned that the proposed withdrawal to .50 csm would not 
have maintained the natural condition of the river, and that a maxi-
mum loss of 8.1 % of the brown trout's spawning and incubation habi-
tat was too significant to allow.l65 The Board also found that the resort 
158 [d. 
159 [d. at *4. 
160 Okerrw, 1992 WL 186658, at *5. 
161 [d. 
162 [d. at *6. As the Board said: 
[d. 
River ice can harm the habitat of fish and their food chain. Freezing of the river 
substrate affects invertebrates, deposited eggs, and certain fish species which over-
winter in the gravels. Fluctuating water levels caused by ice formation and ice break-
up can disturb the river banks, cause substrate scouring, and drive fish into areas not 
normally used; when the water level drops, the fish can become stranded. Extensive 
river ice accumulations can drive fish from limited overwintering areas to other less 
desirable locations. These are all natural processes; the degree of impact from stream 
flow modifications is difficult to assess without extensive observations. 
163 [d. at *8. 
164 [d. at *10. 
165 Okemo, 1992 WL 186658, at *10. 
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had not explored fully alternatives to increased Black River with-
drawals. l66 However, the Board did find that allowing the resort to 
decrease the flow to .78 csm was acceptable.167 
In reaching its conclusion that the .50 csm rate was too low, the 
Board decided that the proposed withdrawal would violate the state's 
shorelines statute because the proposed withdrawals would not main-
tain the Black River in its natural condition.168 The Board decided that 
the resort's need to increase snowmaking was not outweighed by the 
loss of habitat for the brown trout, and that the resort had not inves-
tigated sufficiently other alternatives.169 
Moreover, in reviewing the issue of the loss of natural habitats the 
Board decided that a .50 csm withdrawal would both "destroy and 
significantly imperil the necessary wildlife habitat for trout in the 
section of the Black River affected by the water withdrawal."17o The 
Board expressed concern not only about the effect on trout, but the 
possible effects on other species populations in the area as well. l71 In 
language that evokes the public trust doctrine in its balancing of 
burdens and benefits, the Board decided that the harm that would 
result from the increased water withdrawals outweighed the profit 
from skiing: 
[T]he Board is mindful of the testimony that established that the 
ski industry in general and Okemo in particular contribute to the 
economy and the recreational industry of Vermont and that snow-
making is of increasing importance to the ski industry in Vermont 
. . .. [H]owever, the Board concludes that neither Okemo nor any 
other party has adequately demonstrated the public benefit that 
would specifically accrue from the Step-Down Proposal as op-
posed to the general benefits of snowmaking and Okemo's opera-
tions.172 
The Board thus found that the loss of aquatic habitat outweighed the 
benefit of dramatically increased withdrawals merely for the purpose 
of snowmaking.173 
166 [d. 
167 [d. at *8. 
168 [d. at *11. Note that the plaintiffs in the Sugarbush case did not file their appeal under the 
state streams or shorelines statutes, which perhaps, in part, explains the success of the Vermont 
Natural Resources Council in Okemo. See supra notes 103-42 and accompanying text. 
169 [d. at *12. 
1700kemo, 1992 WL 186658, at *12. 
171 [d. at *13. 
172 [d. 
173 [d. 
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Finally, in reviewing the issue of the developments affecting public 
investments, which the Board would not allow without demonstration 
that public or quasi-public investments would not be endangered, the 
Board held in favor of a .78 csm streamflow rather than the resort's 
proposed rate of .50 csm.l74 The Board reasoned that because the 
general public fishes in the river, the streamflow should be considered 
a "public investment," and the ski area, through its proposed with-
drawals of .50 csm, would destroy particular habitats and would vio-
late Vermont environmentallaw.l75 
The snowmaking cases in New England thus far have reached 
differing results.l76 Okemo appears to have balanced best the compet-
ing interests of environmentalism and economic development, while 
the Sugarbush and Loon Mountain cases were decided based on the 
perceived value of ski resorts to New England economies.l77 Arguably, 
New England courts have not yet considered adequately the impact 
of increased water withdrawals upon aquatic habitats and the rights 
of each state's citizens in preserving their water supplies.l78 
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
A. History of the Doctrine 
Given the difficulty New England courts and administrative agen-
cies have had in deciding water withdrawal issues, the application of 
different theories, such as the public trust doctrine, might provide 
guidance in weighing the various factors involved in snowmaking. 
Although scholars have debated the scope of the public trust doctrine, 
its use in the snowmaking cases could provide a needed balancing of 
social, economic and environmental concerns.l79 The basic principle of 
the public trust doctrine is that the government holds certain natural 
resources in trust for the people of the state.lSO Historically, the public 
174Id. at *14-15. 
175 See Okemo, 1992 WL 186658, at *14-15. 
176 See McLean, supra note 17, at 244. 
177 See id.; see also Dubois, supra note 10, at *53--55. 
178 See McLean, supra note 17, at 244. 
179 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1971); see also Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 63, 79 (1982) (arguing that public trust doctrine is inapplicable to water rights contro-
versies because it provides no clear guidelines for balancing community water rights with 
protection of streamflows). 
180 RODGERS, supra note 8, at 171. 
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trust doctrine has been applied most often to water rightS.181 In its 
- early formation in Roman and English law, the doctrine dealt with 
individual persons' property rights in the ocean, lakes, and rivers.l82 
The early public trust doctrine generally held that the earth's waters 
belonged to no one person, but rather that the general public had 
"undefined rights of use and enjoyment" of the earth's waters for 
navigation, commerce, and fishing. l83 
Since its adoption in America, the scope of the public trust doctrine 
has grown.l84 Generally, legal scholars now agree that public trust 
property must be held available by the government for the use of the 
public, that trust property must never be sold, and that the govern-
ment must maintain the property for particular public uses.185 Al-
though the doctrine in the United States was, at its inception, con-
ceived of as particularly applicable to navigation and commercial uses 
of water, the doctrine since has expanded to include the rights to use 
and enjoy water for recreational purposes.l86 Additionally, courts have 
held that the doctrine now protects parklands, marshlands, and even 
wildlife.187 Finally, the doctrine also has been applied to lands held 
solely for conservation purposes; as the California Supreme Court 
said in Marks v. Whitney, one of the purposes of the trust is the 
"preservation of . . . lands in their natural state, so that they may 
serve as ecological units for scientific study, for open space, and as 
environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine 
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area."I88 
The first case in United States history to recognize the public trust 
doctrine was Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois. 189 In Illinois 
Central, the United States and the state of Illinois wished to construct 
a railroad, and the state gave the Illinois Central Railroad Company 
181 See Sax, supra note 179, at 475. 
182 See RODGERS, supra note 8, at 172-73. Note that originally the public trust doctrine only 
applied to waters that "ebbed and flowed" but now includes "streams of any consequence." Id. 
at 172. 
183 See Sax, supra note 179, at 475 (quoting R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 109-10 
(4th ed. 1956». 
184 See id. at 476, 556-57. 
185 Id. at 477. 
186 RODGERS, supra note 8, at 174. 
187 See id. at 172-73; see also Anna R.C. Caspersen, Note, The Public 'Prust Doctrine and the 
Impossibility oj"Takings" by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357, 368--69 (1996) (appli-
cation of public trust doctrine to wildlife). 
188 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
189 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 387 (1892). 
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the contract.l90 The state gave the railroad the Illinois land on the 
route between Chicago and Dubuque, Iowa, in a grant, which, in 
essence, gave the railroad ownership over part of Lake Michigan.191 
The railroad proceeded to fill in part of the lake so as to lay its 
tracks.l92 Under the Lake Front Act, which governed the contract, 
the railroad planned to pay the state at least seven percent of its gross 
earnings annually in exchange for the grant of the lake beds.l93 How-
ever, on July 1, 1873, the Illinois legislature repealed the Lake Front 
Act.l94 Chicago then sued to regain its ownership in fee of the land 
and riparian rights.195 In its first opinion to enunciate the parameters 
of the public trust doctrine, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the state of Illinois was the owner in fee of the submerged bed 
of Lake Michigan, but that the state held title to the submerged lands 
in trust for the people of Illinois.1OO The Court based its decision on 
historical water law, which holds that the ownership of lands covered 
by tide waters belongs to the state within which the water lies.197 
Although prior to this case the public trust doctrine had applied only 
to bodies of water which had tides, and therefore ebbed and flowed, 
the Supreme Court nonetheless held that state ownership of water 
applied to the Great Lakes.l98 The crucial distinction to the Court was 
not whether the water ebbed and flowed, but rather whether the state 
used the body of water for commerce.l99 The Court reasoned that if 
commerce were carried out upon a body of water, then this fact alone 
was sufficient to establish the state's rights in the water.200 
On the issue of the land and water being held in public trust, the 
Court said that title was "held in trust for the people of the State that 
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carryon commerce over 
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction 
or interference of private parties."201 The Court went further to say 
that granting water and land in fee, as the State previously had done, 
190 Id. at 398. 
191 See id. 
192 Id. at 403. 
198 Id. at 406 n.l. 
194 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 410-11. 
195 Id. at 412-14. 
196 Id. at 452. 
197 Id. at 435. 
198 I d. at 436--37. 
199 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 436. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 452. 
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was inconsistent with the exercise of the trust.202 Finally, the Court 
said that the trust is a governmental property that cannot be alien-
ated, which "follows necessarily from the public character of the prop-
erty, being held by the whole people for purposes in which the whole 
people are interested."203 
Some commentators, in reviewing the Illinois Central case, have 
argued that the case provides background for recognizing that the 
public trust doctrine is quasi-constitutional in nature.204 As writer 
Harrison C. Dunning recognized, the Illinois Central case is the first 
in a line of decisions that recognize the public trust doctrine as an 
implied state constitutional doctrine requiring governments to pro-
tect public access to natural resources.205 
In response to interpretation of the doctrine as impliedly constitu-
tional, however, commentator James L. Huffman believes that courts 
are using this argument in an attempt to "circumvent the constitu-
tional protections of private property" and, in reality, are manufactur-
ing new rights.206 Further, Huffman argues that "there is no evidence 
that the Supreme Court viewed the public trust or the navigation 
servitude as quid pro quo for a generous grant of lands to new 
states."207 Finally, Huffman fears that the public trust doctrine is 
being abused by states today in order to limit private landowners' 
water rights and access to water resources.208 
Since the Illinois Central case, courts have expanded upon the 
public trust doctrine. According to Professor Joseph L. Sax, courts 
have developed the doctrine to the extent that: 
[W]hen a state holds a resource which is available for the free use 
of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepti-
cism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to 
202 [d. at 453. 
203 [d. at 456. 
204 See Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Prop-
erty Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989). 
205 [d. at 522-23. 
206 James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional 
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 548-49 (1989). 
207 See id. at 553. 
208 See id. at 548-49; see also Alison Reiser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property 
Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 415-16 
(1991) (discussing Professor Huffman's fears that greater use of public trust doctrine will expand 
power of counter-majoritarian courts and limit powers of state legislatures, which by their 
natures are more democratic). 
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reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject 
public uses to the self-interest of private parties .... 209 
The case of Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission demonstrates 
the skepticism which Professor Sax notes.210 In this 1966 case, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court utilized the public trust doc-
trine to prevent a private corporation, in conjunction with the state 
Greylock Reservation Authority, from developing a ski resort in a 
state park.211 In Greylock, local citizens who lived near Mount Grey-
lock sought a declaratory judgment from the court that a 1964 devel-
opment agreement between the Authority and the management cor-
poration was invalid.212 The plaintiffs filed their suit out of concern for 
Mount Greylock's preservation as an unspoiled natural forest, a use 
that the plaintiffs believed the Authority and management company's 
agreement threatened.213 
The court held that the agreement was not authorized and that the 
proposed tramway, chairlifts, ski trails, and other facilities would 
interfere with the natural state and appearance of the reservation.214 
The court held that the management agreement was a complete dele-
gation of the duties of the Authority to the management company, a 
delegation which the state could not sanction.215 Given the Authority's 
limited funds, the court feared that the Authority would be unable to 
"exert any practical or effective supervision over the Resort."216 Fi-
nally, implicitly relying upon the public trust doctrine, the court could 
find no express grant of power to the Authority to allow the use of 
public lands and funds for a private commercial venture.217 
The public trust doctrine has been applied in the past to situations 
involving water and ski resorts, situations similar to the snowmaking 
cases.218 Additionally, courts have applied the doctrine to pure conser-
vation interests, as in the 1983 case involving Mono Lake entitled 
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County.219 The 
209 Sax, supra note 179, at 490 (emphasis in original). 
210 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 410 (1966). 
211 See id. at 426. 
212 [d. at 411. 
213 [d. at 411-12. 
214 See id. at 421. 
215 Greylock, 350 Mass. at 423. 
216 [d. 
217 See id. at 426. 
218 See Illirwis Central, 146 U.S. at 452; Greylock, 350 Mass. at 426. 
219 National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
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Mono Lake case is important not only because it recognizes so em-
phatically the importance of preservation of ecology, but also because 
of its application of the public trust to instream uses of water.220 
In the Mono Lake case, the National Audubon Society filed suit to 
enjoin the Department of Water and Power (DWP) from diverting 
water from tributaries to Mono Lake for use as drinking water for 
the people of Los Angeles.221 Mono Lake, the second largest lake in 
the state, contained no fish but was home to a large population of 
shrimp and vast numbers of birds.222 Additionally, the lake was a site 
of geological and tourist interest.223 
Since 1940 the DWP had been diverting the water because of a 1921 
amendment to the state's Water Commission Act which said that 
drinking water was the "highest use of water."224 Due to the water 
withdrawals, however, the level of the lake was dropping dramati-
cally.225 Gulls were abandoning islands that lay within the lake because 
of coyote intrusion, and the withdrawals were adversely affecting the 
overall scenic beauty and ecological value of the lake.226 
The National Audubon Society filed its complaint under the public 
trust doctrine.227 The California Supreme Court responded with a 
strong opinion in favor of the plaintiffs, stressing the importance of 
the public trust doctrine in conserving natural resources.228 The court 
held that the state must consider the public trust doctrine whenever 
it makes water resource decisions, and that the state was obligated 
to protect the public trust whenever possible.229 The court recognized 
that the viability of the state does, in part, rest upon its access to 
water, but that considerations of prosperity and habitability could not 
preclude an evaluation of the effects of the water withdrawals upon 
the lake.230 
220 See Jan s. Stevens, The Public Trnst and In-Stream Uses, 19 ENVTL. L. 605, 612-13 (1989) 
(discussing various California cases which support the proposition that it is "entirely reasonable 
to apply the public trust to protect fish in navigable waters"). 
221 National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 712. 
222 Id. at 711. 
223 Id. 
224 I d. at 713. 
225 Id. at 711. 
226 National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 716. 
227Id. at 717. 
228 See id. at 719. 
229 I d. at 728. 
23°Id. at 719-24. The court noted that state courts have concurrent original jurisdiction in 
water rights controversies; however, in cases involving water use, if a state water board's 
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In reaching its decision, the court considered three aspects of the 
public trust doctrine: its purpose, its scope, and the powers and duties 
of the state as trustees of the public truSt.231 Although the court 
recognized that public trust easements generally were used to protect 
the public's right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, and boat in the navigable 
waters of the state, the court also affirmed the idea that the purpose 
of the trust included protection of lands in their natural state.232 In 
terms of Mono Lake, the court agreed that the scenic views of the 
lake, pure air, and the lake's use as a nesting and feeding spot for birds 
were values that the public trust doctrine protected.233 The court 
further stated that the streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands of 
the state were part of the people's common heritage, and that the 
state could surrender the use of this heritage only when such an act 
was consistent with the purposes of the trust.234 Finally, in balancing 
the state's need for water against public trust protection, the court 
said that: 
[A]s a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve 
appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses. In 
so doing, however, the state must bear in mind its duty as trustee 
to consider the effect of the taking on the public trust and to 
preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses 
protected by the trust.235 
The Mono Lake decision thus demonstrates one court's willingness to 
weigh not only economic factors, but also social and ecological factors, 
when deciding water rights issues.236 
The Mono Lake decision also demonstrates a court's progressive 
use of the public trust doctrine in a situation involving preservationist 
concerns.237 In protecting the ecology of the California lake, the court 
went beyond the traditional application of the doctrine to commercial 
rights, such as fishing and navigation, and instead recognized the 
importance of the doctrine solely to preserve ecology.238 Commenta-
experience or expert knowledge is useful, courts should ask for the water board's assistance. 
See id. at 731-32. 
231 National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719. 
232 [d. 
233 [d. 
234 [d. at 724. 
235 [d. at 728. 
236 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 729. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
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tors, including Professor Joseph Sax, have advocated for use of the 
doctrine in more atypical situations such as the Mono Lake scenario.239 
As Professor Sax said, the doctrine should apply to all situations in 
which "diffuse public interests need protection against tightly organ-
ized groups with clear and immediate goals."240 
Furthermore, other writers have suggested use of the Mono Lake 
case as a gateway to applying the public trust doctrine to stream-
flows.241 Writer and lawyer Ralph W. Johnson first endorsed the idea 
of utilizing the public trust doctrine in streamflow-related cases, ar-
guing that the public trust doctrine is useful in the Western states 
because the doctrine serves as a method of solving problems involving 
vast water withdrawals that threaten navigation, fishing, and wild-
life.242 He believes that because courts previously have applied the 
doctrine to situations where landfills destroy navigation and other 
uses, "it should equally apply to constrain the extraction of water that 
destroys navigation and other public interests."243 Because the pri-
orities of the people of the nation have moved from consumption 
to conservation, Johnson argues, the public trust doctrine should be 
used to reflect this fundamental change.244 
In opposition to the position favoring public trust protection of 
streamflows, however, are other arguments which allege that the 
doctrine is an inappropriate remedy for the problem of dwindling 
rivers and streams.245 For example, commentator Roderick E. Wal-
ston argues that the public trust doctrine should not be used to 
protect streamflows, at least in the Western states.246 Walston theo-
rizes that the public trust doctrine is inapplicable to Western water 
rights issues because the West adheres to a prior appropriation sys-
tem, which provides that a landowner has the right to divert and use 
the water which flows next to the owner's land so long as the water 
is put to reasonable and beneficial use.247 Walston fears that the use 
239 See Sax, supra note 179, at 556. 
240 [d. 
241 See Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection/or Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 V.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 233, 257 (1980). 
242 See id. at 233-34; see also Stevens, supra note 220, at 605--06. 
243 See Johnson, supra note 241, at 257-58 (emphasis in original). 
244 See id. at 265. 
245 See Walston, supra note 179, at 80-81. Note that Walston's article was written before the 
Supreme Court of California decided the Mono Lake case. 
246 [d. at 63--65. 
247 [d. at 72-73. The obvious response to Walston's argument, at least from a New England 
perspective, is that Eastern states follow a riparian water rights system and thus this argument 
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of the public trust doctrine could jeopardize long-standing water 
rights in the West because the doctrine provides no clear guidelines 
for balancing community water rights with protection of stream-
flows.248 Further, Walston fears that use of the doctrine will halt 
diversions of water that Westerners require in order to sustain con-
tinued economic growth.249 Ultimately, Walston believes that a balanc-
ing between ecological and urban or agricultural uses of water is 
beyond the scope of the doctrine, and that use of the public trust 
doctrine will not provide the proper answer to Western water rights 
concerns.250 
B. The Aspen Wilderness Workshop Case: Applying 
the Public Trust Doctrine to Snowmaking 
The only snowmaking case in which a plaintiff has successfully 
employed public trust ideas is one from the West, Aspen Wilderness 
Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Board.251 The Aspen 
case, which the Colorado Supreme Court decided on June 19, 1995, is 
the only example yet of an environmental group successfully blocking 
increased withdrawals of water from streams for snowmaking based 
on a public trust doctrine theory.252 
In January, 1976, defendant Colorado Water Conservation Board 
(CWCB) determined that in Snowmass Creek continuous flows of a 
minimum of twelve cubic feet of water per second (cfs) were needed 
throughout the year to meet the state statute's standard of "preserv-
ing the natural environment to a reasonable degree."263 The state 
Water Court issued a decree to this effect in June, 1980.254 By 1991, 
however, the Aspen area was increasingly developing, and county 
officials, including those of the AspenJPitkin Planning Office, began to 
question the 1980 decree.255 Because of this questioning, the Division 
does not apply to Eastern water controversies. See infra note 286 for an elaboration on charac-
teristics distinguishing prior appropriation from the riparian doctrine. 
248 Walston, supra note 179, at 79. 
249 [d. at SO. 
260 See id. at 92-93. 
261 901 P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1995), reh'g denied, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 321 (Sept. 11, 1995). 
262 See id. at 1260-61. 
263 [d. at 1253. Note that the measurement used by the Colorado Supreme Court, cubic feet 
of water per second, is different from the measurement New Englanders generally have used 
in the streamflow cases decided, which is cubic feet per second per square mile. See, e.g., Okemo 
Mountain, Inc., Application No. 2S0351-12A-EB, 1992 WL 186658, at *1 (Vt. Envtl. Bd. July 
23,1992). 
264 Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1254. 
265 [d. 
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of Wildlife's instream flow coordinator began an investigation of the 
creek.256 After conducting the investigation, the coordinator decided 
that twelve cfs was both too high during certain times of the year, and 
too low during others, suggesting to the investigators that a compu-
tational error had been made in the earlier assessment.257 
In March, 1992, the CWCB decided that it should re-examine the 
creek's instream water flows.258 The CWCB held meetings and re-
ceived public comments regarding streamflow.259 On September 15, 
1992, the CWCB adopted a recommendation that called for a plan for 
streamflows in three different parts of the Creek during the summer 
and winter.260 The CWCB also decided to initiate proceedings before 
the Water Court in order to secure a decree allowing the CWCB to 
increase its appropriations.261 The opinion states in a footnote, as a 
possible explanation for the CWCB's decision to allow increased ap-
propriation, that the Aspen Skiing Co., the corporation responsible 
for the Aspen Ski Resort area, desired to increase its snowmaking on 
Snowmass Mountain.262 Therefore, the corporation would obviously be 
able to expand if the CWCB increased the resort's twelve cfs winter 
appropriation from the Creek.263 
On September 16, 1992, the plaintiff Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 
a non-profit environmental group, filed its lawsuit, arguing that the 
CWCB's decision not to enforce the full twelve cfs instream flow, and 
to allow the ski resort to increase its appropriations, was a "perma-
nent relinquishment of a public instream flow right."264 The plaintiff 
further alleged that the streamflow decision should have been made 
through a formal hearing at the Water Court rather than by an 
informal administrative body.265 The complaint alleged that the CWCB 
had exceeded its authority and that the CWCB's action infringed upon 
the authority of the Water Court.266 Further, the plaintiff argued that 
because the CWCB's action "constituted a donation of a public re-
source to a private company [the Aspen Skiing Company which 
256 [d. 
257 [d. 
258 [d. 
259 Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1255. 
260 [d. 
261 [d. 
262 [d. 
263 [d. at 1255 n.9. 
264 Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1255. 
265 [d. 
266 [d. 
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planned to divert the excess water during the winter for snowmak-
ing]," the CWCB had breached its fiduciary duty to the public.267 
The Colorado Supreme Court found for the plaintiff.268 The court 
decided that under the state Water Rights Determination and Ad-
ministration Act of 1969, the CWCB has a statutory duty to appro-
priate the minimum stream-flow necessary to preserve the natural 
environment.269 The court held that the CWCB had to implement the 
twelve cfs limit under the 1980 decree unless the decree was reviewed 
and then modified by the Water Court.270 
In finding for the plaintiff, the court based its decision upon the 
notion of a "fiduciary duty" owed by the CWCB to the state.271 The 
court acknowledged that the duties of the CWCB were to appropri-
ate, according to the state's constitution, "such waters of natural 
streams and lakes as the board determines may be required for mini-
mum stream-flows or for natural surface water levels or volumes for 
natural lakes to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable 
degree."272 However, the court interpreted this role not as a plenary 
grant of authority allowing private landowners the right to use any 
and all of the state's water, but rather as subject to the CWCB's 
fiduciary duty to the people of the State of Colorado.273 Further, the 
CWCB's power was subject to decisions by the state Water Court.274 
The Colorado Supreme Court held that once the Water Court had 
made a decision as to what streamflow was necessary to protect the 
environment of the state, the CWCB was bound by the Water Court's 
decision.275 The court held that the CWCB must "fulfill its duty to the 
people of this state, other appropriators of water as well as those 
without water rights, by appropriating only so much water as is 
necessary to preserve the environment .... "276 
Therefore, although the majority in Aspen never used explicitly the 
phrase "public trust doctrine," its language concerning "fiduciary 
duty" and its reasoning constituted a de facto use of the public trust 
doctrine.277 This case's discussion of the public trust principles inher-
267 [d. 
268 [d. at 1256. 
269 Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1260. 
270 [d. 
271 [d. 
272 [d. at 1256. 
273 [d. at 1256-57. 
274 Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1261. 
275 [d. at 1260. 
276 [d. at 1259--60. 
277 See id. at 1260-61. 
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ent in the snowmaking controversy provides a bridge to the use of 
the doctrine in New England. 
V. ApPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
TO THE NEW ENGLAND CASES 
Given the difficulty faced by environmental plaintiffs in cases like 
that of Loon Mountain and Sugarbush,278 and the elasticity displayed 
by the public trust doctrine during its history,279 it may be possible to 
apply the public trust doctrine to the New England snowmaking 
setting. New England courts and environmentalists will benefit from 
applying the flexible doctrine used in the Aspen, Greylock, and Mono 
Lake decisions to approach snowmaking and ski resort development 
issues.280 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in Colorado 
In terms of environmentalist goals of balancing ecology and eco-
nomics, the most successful of the snowmaking cases has been Aspen, 
in which the plaintiff used a quasi-public trust theory to halt increased 
withdrawals of water for snowmaking.281 Aspen is interesting because 
the majority based its decision on a "fiduciary duty" rather than 
expressly upon the "public trust."282 Despite different terminology, 
however, these ideas are arguably identical because both focus on the 
need to protect the public's interest in a natural resource.283 
The language used in Aspen is notable because without stating the 
term public trust, the court's reasoning is nonetheless apparently 
based upon this doctrine.284 Aspen involved the traditional public trust 
problem of a state agency overstepping its boundaries and effectively 
donating a public resource to a private institution.285 In order to 
remedy this problem, the Colorado Supreme Court said that the 
CWCB, a state administrative agency, had a "unique statutory 
fiduciary duty" to the people of the state, and must "protect the 
278 See supra Section lILA, IILE. 
279 See supra Section IV. 
280 See Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1259-61; National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 
658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 
350 Mass. 410, 426 (1966). 
281 Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1259-61. 
282 [d. at 1260. 
283 See id.; see also Greylock, 350 Mass. at 426. 
284 See Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1259-61. 
285 See id. at 1255; see also Sax, supra note 179, at 490. 
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public" and "preserve the natural environment."286 Therefore, the 
Court held, the state agency needed to reevaluate its planned alloca-
tion of Snowmass Creek in light of its duty to the citizens of Colo-
rado.287 
Although the two decisions are different both factually and in terms 
of a thirty-year time span between the dates of their decision, Aspen 
is nonetheless remarkably similar in its reasoning to Greylock.288 The 
Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning in Aspen evokes that of Grey-
lock, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that 
the private management corporation, that wished to build a ski resort 
upon Mount Greylock, could not be delegated such a vast amount of 
authority by a state agency.289 The Massachusetts court held for the 
plaintiffs because it feared the use of the unspoiled public lands for 
commercial profit.290 
A similar fear of private exploitation of public resources seems to 
lie behind the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Aspen.291 
This fear is demonstrated by the Colorado court's recognition that the 
Aspen ski resort desired to utilize the extra water that the CWCB 
286 Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1260. Note that the Colorado Supreme Court in its opinion holds that 
once a state Water Court makes a judicial determination as to "what 'minimum stream flow' is 
necessary to protect the environment, the Conservation Board is obligated to abide by that 
judicial determination and thereby to fulfill its duty to the people of this state, other appropria-
tors of water as well as those without water rights, by appropriating only so much water as is 
necessary to preserve the environment." [d. at 1259-60. The notion of "appropriation" refers to 
the historical system of Western water rights, which is known as the prior appropriation 
doctrine. See Walston, supra note 179, at 73. According to Roderick Walston, the appropriation 
doctrine "authorizes the diversion and use of water, if it is put to reasonable and beneficial use. 
Priority to the use of water depends on the chronological sequence of competing appropriations; 
to be 'first in time' is to be 'first in right.''' [d. (footnote omitted). Further, Walston notes that 
"[in] Colorado, the appropriation doctrine ... provides the exclusive basis for acquiring a water 
right." [d. The appropriation doctrine is different from the riparian doctrine, to which most 
Eastern states adhere, which provides that "a landowner has the right to use water appurtenant 
to his land, subject to the right of downstream landowners to the continued natural flow.~' [d. 
at 72. Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court's holding in Aspen, providing that the state owes 
a fiduciary duty to appropriators of water as well as non-appropriators, perhaps explains why 
the Colorado Supreme Court did not want to adhere explicitly to the public trust doctrine, since 
under the prior appropriation doctrine the state, in a sense, does not really own the natural 
resource. See Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1259-61. Rather, the appropriators almost own the resource, 
and the state merely apportions it; while in the East, landowners use the water, and there is no 
real sense of ownership beyond that of the state. See Walston, supra note 179, at 72-73. 
1187 See Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1253. 
288 See id. at 1259-61; Greylock, 350 Mass. at 426. 
289 Greylock, 350 Mass. at 425. 
290 See id. at 426. 
291 See id.; see also Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1259-61. 
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had planned to allow for more snowmaking.292 In the modern context, 
therefore, the CWCB can be analogized to the state-run Greylock 
Reservation Authority, which desired but was prevented from hand-
ing over control of the state park to the private corporation.293 Like 
the Authority, the CWCB was not allowed to exceed the power given 
to it by the state, and therefore the state prevented a private corpo-
ration from profiting from excessive resource use.294 
B. What Has Gone Wrong in New England? 
The New England snowmaking cases adverse to environmental con-
cerns, specifically the Loon Mountain and Sugarbush cases, are nota-
ble for their failure to balance environmental and economic issues.295 
The decisions are in no way activist, but rather almost complacent, 
accepting the current reality of vast snowmaking without concern for 
environmental impacts.296 Perhaps these decisions spring from a de-
sire that snowmaking policy be made by the legislature rather than 
by courts or administrative boards.297 
The Loon Mountain decision, in granting summary judgment for 
the defendants and disregarding all of the plaintiff's claims, demon-
strated most clearly a lack of any consideration of environmental 
issues.298 Unlike Greylock, the Loon Mountain decision refused to 
consider thoughtfully the possible impacts of increased ski resort 
development.299 Rather, in the Loon Mountain case, Judge Barbadoro 
decided to believe that snowmaking is a way of life in New England, 
and therefore considered only the detrimental economic impacts on 
the state of New Hampshire which limited snowmaking would cre-
ate.3OO As the judge wrote: 
[T]o properly set the scope of practicable alternatives, it is im-
portant to remember that Loon is presently using water from 
Loon Pond for snowmaking under its existing permit and Lincoln 
292 See Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1255 n.9. 
293 See Greylock, 350 Mass. at 425. 
294 See Aspen, 901 P.2d at 1259-61; Greylock, 350 Mass. at 425-26. 
295 See Dubois, supra note 10, at *53-55; McLean, supra note 17, at 244. 
296 See Dubois, supra note 10, at *53-55; McLean, supra note 17, at 244. 
297 See In re Appeal of Vermont Natural Resources Council, Docket Nos. 92-02 and 92-05, at 
40 (Vt. Water Resources Bd. Feb. 8,1993) (findings offact, conclusions oflawand order), motion 
to alter or reconsider denied, Mar. 1, 1993. 
298 See Dubois, supra note 10, at *53. 
299 See id.; Greylock, 350 Mass. at 421. 
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uses the pond as a primary municipal water source. The Forest 
Service considered but rejected a suggested alternative of no 
snowmaking because "snowmaking has become a necessity in 
eastern skiing to assure a reasonable opening date and to provide 
skiing during low natural snow years." Thus, the relevant ques-
tion is whether the Forest Service considered the existence of 
practicable alternatives and mitigation measures for the in-
creased use of Loon Pond .... The Forest Service concluded that 
snowmaking was a necessary component of skiing at Loon and 
that using Loon Pond as the water source with limitations on 
withdrawals was the best alternative.30l 
In accepting the Forest Service's finding that "snowmaking has be-
come a necessity," and that the use of Loon Pond for snowmaking 
must be increased, the judge implicitly based his decision upon his 
perception of the economic value of skiing to the state of New Hamp-
shire.302 Although the judge conceded that Loon Pond might have 
benefitted from more environmental study, he dismissed this concern 
by giving great deference to the decisions made by the Forest Serv-
ice.303 
Judge Barbadoro's holding, which included no real weighing of the 
environmental factors involved, was directly adverse to the goals of 
the public trust doctrine.304 Although the economic impacts of de-
creased snowmaking are certainly important in the balance of factors, 
considering the vast amounts of revenue which skiing brings to a 
community, the public trust doctrine demands that other factors be 
considered as well.305 As the Supreme Court of California understood, 
issues of cost and the difficulty of obtaining water from other water 
sources are relevant; nonetheless, they are only some of the factors 
to be considered along with those concerning ecology and natural 
resource preservation.306 By refusing to insist upon a more critical 
analysis of the situation involving Loon Pond, Judge Barbardoro vio-
lated the very basis of the public trust doctrine.307 
Perhaps, had Judge Barbadoro properly evaluated the factors dis-
cussed in the Mono Lake decision, he might have decided the case the 
301 [d. at *53-54 (emphasis in original). 
302 [d. at *55. 
303 See id. at *4l. 
304 See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal.), em. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
305 See id. at 729. 
306 [d. 
307 See Dubois, supra note 10, at *55. 
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same way.30B The resort did already have a permit from the town to 
withdraw water, and so, in effect, the resort already had been granted 
use of Loon Pond's water for the resort.309 More importantly, unlike 
the withdrawals in the Sugarbush and Okemo cases, which directly 
threatened thriving trout populations, no fish currently lived in Loon 
Pond, and so there was no threat of destruction of a species.310 Instead, 
the fear at Loon Pond was that of decreased fisheries potential, and 
of the general degradation of Loon Pond's current animal and plant 
life.3ll The fact that the pond lacked a current fish population, com-
bined with the great revenue and tax benefit generated by the resort, 
might have led the Judge to the same result.312 However, it is the 
method of analysis which is key to the public trust doctrine, the 
method of weighing all of the important factors, and it is this method 
which the Judge disregarded.313 
In addition to the Loon Mountain decision, the Vermont Water 
Resources Board in deciding the Sugarbush case seemed skeptical of 
environmental concerns and expressly rejected the plaintiff's public 
trust doctrine argument.314 Although the plaintiffs argued that the 
WRB lacked jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs' public trust argu-
ments, and that the Vermont state Legislature needed to make an 
express determination that snowmaking was consistent with the pub-
lic trust doctrine, the WRB nonetheless reviewed the case.315 The 
WRB believed that the legislature had delegated sufficient supervi-
sory power to the ANR to decide these issues, and therefore the WRB 
was within its right of review.316 
However, despite the WRB's decision, which favored the ski resort 
by allowing significant drawdowns of the Mad River, the WRB none-
308 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 729. 
309 See Dubois, supra note 10, at *53. 
310 See supra notes 118--19, 159 and accompanying text. 
311 See Dubois, supra note 10, at *38--39. 
312 See id. 
313 See id. at *52-55; see also National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 729. 
314 In re Appeal of Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92--05, at *40 (Vt. 
Water Resources Bd. Feb. 8, 1993) (findings of fact, conclusions of law and order), motion to 
alter or reconsider denied, Mar. 1, 1993. 
315 Id. at *39-41. This case stands as a clear example of a matter which would have been better 
brought before a state or federal court and argued under public trust principles. Unlike the 
Vermont Water Resources Board, which evidently believed that it was an inappropriate forum 
for a public-trust based decision, a court would have the power to address and determine the 
public trust. Id. at *40. 
316Id. 
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theless did acknowledge the existence of the public trust doctrine.317 
The WRB stated that the "work of determining the implications of 
the common law public trust doctrine as reflected in the Vermont 
Constitution is best left to the judicial and legislative branches."318 
This statement demonstrates that although the WRB did review and 
decide the Sugarbush case, it nonetheless implicitly recognized the 
value of the public trust doctrine in snowmaking.319 Moreover, the 
WRB argued that it was improper for an administrative body to make 
policy decisions involving the public trust doctrine.320 
C. Applying a Public Trust Approach 
to New England Snowmaking 
An analysis of both the Sugarbush and Loon Mountain cases sug-
gests that another legal approach to reviewing snowmaking issues 
may be beneficial. 321 Moreover, the use of the public trust doctrine in 
other jurisdictions further suggests that this doctrine is particularly 
suited to snowmaking and provides a vehicle for courts to require that 
states consider important environmental values before allowing in-
creased ski resort development and its attendant environmental im-
pacts.322 
The public trust doctrine is key to the snowmaking issue because 
of the interests involved: preservation of the public's right to maintain 
its water supply, and also use of this supply for fishing and boating.323 
As the evidence indicates, increased water withdrawals not only 
threaten to dry up rivers, but also create the danger of destruction of 
fish habitats.324 Destruction of fish and other habitats, which are public 
resources, by ski resorts, which are private organizations, clearly 
violates the essence of the public trust doctrine.325 
Additionally, environmentalists may argue that New England 
states, by effectively donating vast amounts of publicly-owned water 
317 [d. at *39-41. 
318 [d. at *40. 
319 Vermont Natural Resources Council, Nos. 92-02 and 92-05, at *40. 
320 [d. 
321 See supra Section V.B. 
322 See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 729 (Cal.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
323 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892). 
324 See Laidler, supra note 3, at A5; see also Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 22, at 3-5 
(discussing numerous scientific studies documenting degradation of aquatic habitats due to 
water withdrawals). 
325 See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452; Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 22, at 17-19. 
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to private ski resorts, are also violating another element of the public 
trust doctrine, which holds that states cannot grant public resources 
to private interests.326 As the Illinois Central case noted, a state's 
waters are "held in trust for the people of the State that they may 
enjoy [them] ... freed from the obstruction or interference of private 
parties."327 Likewise in New England, a state holds its waters, includ-
ing its rivers, streams and ponds, for public use and enjoyment.328 
Granting these waters to a private organization, such as a ski area, 
violates a state's obligation to preserve the waters for its citizens.329 
Furthermore, the Mono Lake case describes the importance of 
states preserving the public interest while making resource use deci-
sions.33o In that decision, the California Supreme Court decided that 
when making policy decisions as to water use, the state's Division of 
Water and Power must consider the public's interest and rights in the 
state's water.331 Beyond mere consideration of the trust, however, the 
court held that the state was obligated to protect that trust whenever 
possible.332 
Environmental groups can anticipate an argument by ski resorts 
that the public ultimately does use the water, which has been turned 
to snow, because it is the public which skis at these resorts. Resorts 
will probably argue that the private resort's function is solely to 
convert the water into snow, while the public remains the ultimate 
consumer, as well as the source of the demand. Therefore, resorts will 
most likely claim that the public trust has not been violated. Again, 
however, the Mono Lake case provides a counter-argument. In the 
Mono Lake decision, water was being drained for use by the Los 
Angeles public for drinking and bathing; nonetheless, the public trust 
doctrine still operated.333 A New England court therefore should re-
view a snowmaking case, wherein the public uses the frozen water 
upon which to ski, in the same way as the Supreme Court of California 
reviewed the Mono Lake case, in which the public used the lake's 
water to drink and bathe.334 Regardless of the use at issue, the public 
326 See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 22, at 17. 
327 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452. 
328 See Plaintiff's Memorandum, supra note 22, at 23. 
329 See id. at 24-25. 
330 See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County, 658 P.2d. 709, 728 (Cal.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
331 See id. 
332 See id. 
333 Id. at 713-14. 
334 See id.at 719. 
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trust protects a state's natural resources.335 It is a court's job to 
determine all of the relevant factors bearing upon a particular water 
source's use, and to then decide how the resource may be utilized best 
and yet also preserved in accordance with the public interest.336 
Additionally, the Mono Lake decision's preservationist concerns are 
similar to issues in the New England snowmaking cases. The plaintiff 
National Audubon Society in the Mono Lake decision was concerned 
about the effect of the water withdrawals at Mono Lake upon the 
scenic and ecological values of the lake and its surrounding area.337 
Similarly, New England environmentalists worry about the effect of 
the stream, river and pond drawdowns on fish and other habitats.338 
Because the concerns are comparable, courts in New England should 
likewise require that their state's administrative agencies consider 
and protect public trust values when making decisions regarding 
streamflows.339 
Moreover, New England environmentalists have a strong argument 
if a court is to consider the issue of the use of diverted waters. In the 
Mono Lake decision, the state's Division of Water and Power was 
diverting water from the tributaries to Mono Lake for domestic use 
by the people of the city of Los Angeles.340 The court recognized the 
importance of the fact that California had decided that drinking water 
was the highest use of the state's water, and that this legislative 
decision had to be balanced with the public's interest in protecting the 
scenic and environmental values of the lake.341 Interestingly, however, 
in New England, the water is being diverted for recreational use.342 
Again, use for recreational purposes seems intuitively to be lower on 
the scale of importance than use for drinking or bathing.343 Ultimately, 
New England state legislatures must address as a policy matter 
whether or not snowmaking is one of the most beneficial uses of the 
states' water.344 
335 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719. 
336 [d. at 727-28. 
337 [d. at 711. 
338 See Wapner, supra note 37, at 10. 
339 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728. 
340 See id. at 711. 
341 [d. at 713-14. 
342 See Wapner, supra note 37, at 10. 
343 See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 713. 
344 Professor Johnson argues that in certain cases, legislatures are better suited to making 
resource use decisions because they are a better forum for addressing all involved factors. See 
Johnson, supra note 241, at 266. However, a criticism of Johnson's proposal might be that giving 
state legislatures full reign over resource use decisions, without the involvement of the courts 
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Finally, New England courts must also consider the public's rights 
when balancing water uses.345 The California Supreme Court ex-
pressed this concern for the public in the Mono Lake case, when it 
stated, 
We recognize the substantial concerns voiced by Los Angeles-
the city's need for water ... the cost both in terms of money and 
environmental impact of obtaining water elsewhere .... We hold 
only that [these concerns] do not preclude a reconsideration and 
reallocation which also takes into account the impact of water 
diversion on the Mono Lake environment.346 
New England courts should likewise balance competing financial and 
ecological concerns, while keeping in mind the ultimate goals of the 
public trust in protecting natural resources.347 Courts may, like the 
New Hampshire court in the Loon Mountain case, recognize that 
economic concerns are at stake when making decisions as to snow-
making.348 However, they should also take their cue from the Califor-
nia Supreme Court and realize that economic concerns are not the 
only ones involved.349 New England courts must recognize that the 
public trust doctrine mandates that states consider the trust and 
to safeguard allocations, might place the public trust in danger. For example, a theoretically 
activist legislature that cared about ski resort profits much more than it cared about resource 
prote:.!tion, and defined resort expansion as a greater "public interest," might conceivably grant 
away all public trust rights to a private group. Although this seems farfetched, in actuality it 
is a possibility, because many courts view the public trust doctrine as a rebuttable presumption: 
courts presume that the legislature did not intend to grant away public trust lands, but if the 
legislature evidences a clear and express intention to have done so, then the grant must be 
allowed. See Gould v. Mount Greylock, 350 Mass. 410, 419 (1966) ("The Greylock reservation, as 
rural park land, is not to 'be diverted to another inconsistent public use without plain and explicit 
legislation to that end."'); see also Gwathmey v. North Carolina, 342 N.C. 287, 304 (1995) ("[t]he 
General Assembly has the power to convey such lands [underlying navigable waters], but under 
the public trust doctrine it will be presumed not to have done so. That presumption is rebutted 
by a special grant of the General Assembly conveying the lands in question free of all public 
trust rights, but only if the special grant does so in the clearest and most express terms."). As 
Gwathmey indicates, it is possible that a court might give deference to a clear and express grant 
of normally public-trust-protected land by the state legislature to a private party. See Gwath-
mey,342 N.C. at 304. In the case of snowmaking, a legislature need only define tax revenues 
and general economic gain as in the public interest of the state; having done so, the state can 
then argue that it has diverted its water for another consistent public use, and a court arguably 
could not invalidate this. See also Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 389 (1926) (in 
granting fees for the erection of wharves and docks to private individuals, New York City made 
its grants "not ... solely or primarily for the benefit of the grantee, but primarily for the benefit 
of the city in pursuance of a policy for improving its harbor and furnishing its treasury."). 
345 See Natiorwl Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728 (Cal. 1983). 
346Id. at 729. 
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long-term environmental effects when making resource use deci-
sions.35o 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although ski resort owners argue that snowmaking in New Eng-
land has become a necessity in order for resorts to stay economically 
viable, environmentalists argue that the cost to New England 
streams and rivers is too great.351 Despite the fact that snowmaking 
allows increased coverage, particularly during winters when snow is 
less than plentiful, this increased coverage comes at a price.352 Beyond 
the immediate economic gain which a state receives from ski resorts, 
however, are long-term resource use issues which are in need of 
thoughtful consideration.353 Increased expansion brings increased 
snowmaking; although the state receives greater amounts of revenue, 
both through direct receipts and taxes, from larger resorts, there are 
conservation and ecological protection values which the state is obli-
gated to protect.354 The public trust doctrine stands as one theory 
which will allow this balancing of economics and ecology, and there-
fore the public trust doctrine should be applied to the New England 
snowmaking issue.355 
350 See id. 
351 See supra notes 40-{)7 (regarding debates between environmentalists and ski resort devel-
opers as to the costs and benefits of snowmaking). 
302 See id. 
353 See Dellios, supra note 63, at 6. 
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